Behavioral implementation under incomplete information

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Behavioral-implementation-under-incomplete-infor_2023_Journal-of-Economic-Th.pdf (430.94 KB)

Date

2023-09-11

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Source Title

Journal of Economic Theory

Print ISSN

0022-0531

Electronic ISSN

1095-7235

Publisher

Elsevier

Volume

213

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Pages

1 - 24

Language

en

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Article

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Abstract

We investigate implementation under incomplete information allowing for individuals' choices featuring violations of rationality. Our primitives are individuals' interim choices that do not have to satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preferences. In this setting, we provide necessary as well as sufficient conditions for behavioral implementation under incomplete information. We also introduce behavioral interim incentive Pareto efficiency and investigate its implementability under incomplete information.

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Keywords

Behavioral implementation, Behavioral interim incentive efficiency, Incomplete information, Interim implementation

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https://hdl.handle.net/11693/114494

Published Version (Please cite this version)

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105738

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https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

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Scholarly Publications - Economics