Sabotage in team contests

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buir.contributor.authorDoğan, Serhat
buir.contributor.authorSağlam, Çağrı
dc.citation.epage405en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3-4en_US
dc.citation.spage383en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber180en_US
dc.contributor.authorDoğan, Serhaten_US
dc.contributor.authorKeskin, K.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSağlam, Çağrıen_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-03T10:26:53Z
dc.date.available2020-02-03T10:26:53Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractIn the contest literature, sabotage is defined as a deliberate and costly activity that damages the opponent’s likelihood of winning the contest. Most of the existing results suggest that, anticipating a possible sabotage, contestants would be discouraged from exerting high efforts. In this paper we investigate the act of sabotage in a team contest wherein team members exert costly efforts as a contribution to their team’s aggregate effort, which in turn determines the contest’s outcome. For the baseline model with no sabotage, there exists a corner equilibrium implying a free-rider problem in each team. As for the model with sabotage, our characterization of Nash equilibrium reveals two important results: (i) a unique interior equilibrium exists so that the free-rider problem no longer is a concern and (ii) the discouragement effect of sabotage vanishes for some players. On top of those conclusions, we investigate the team owner’s problems of prize allocation and team formation with the objective being to maximize his team’s winning probability.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11127-019-00643-1en_US
dc.identifier.issn0048-5829
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/52991
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00643-1en_US
dc.source.titlePublic Choiceen_US
dc.subjectTeam contestsen_US
dc.subjectSabotageen_US
dc.subjectTullock contestsen_US
dc.subjectFree ridingen_US
dc.subjectDiscouragement effecten_US
dc.subjectEncouragement effecten_US
dc.titleSabotage in team contestsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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