Every member of the core is as respectful as any other
buir.contributor.author | Dede, Yasemin | |
buir.contributor.author | Koray, Semih | |
dc.citation.epage | 65 | en_US |
dc.citation.issueNumber | 1-2 | en_US |
dc.citation.spage | 55 | en_US |
dc.citation.volumeNumber | 22 | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Dede, Yasemin | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Koray, Semih | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-02-21T16:07:49Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-02-21T16:07:49Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | en_US |
dc.department | Department of Economics | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | We strategically separate different core outcomes. The natural counterparts of a core allocation in a strategic environment are the α-core, the β-core and the strong equilibrium, modified by assuming that utility is transferable in a strategic context as well. Given a core allocation ω of a convex transferable utility (TU) game v, we associate a strategic coalition formation game with (v, ω) in which ω survives, while most other core allocations are eliminated. If the TU game is strictly convex, the core allocations respected by the TU-α-core, the TU-β-core and the TU-strong equilibrium shrink to ω only in the canonical family of coalition formation games associated with (v, ω). A mechanism, which strategically separates core outcomes from noncore outcomes for each convex TU game according to the TU-strong equilibrium notion is reported. | |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2019-02-21T16:07:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bilkent-research-paper.pdf: 222869 bytes, checksum: 842af2b9bd649e7f548593affdbafbb3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018 | en |
dc.description.sponsorship | Acknowledgements BIDEB-2211 Graduate Scholarship Program of the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUB˙TAK) and Foundation for Economic Design are gratefully acknowledged for financial support to Y.D. | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s10058-018-0211-6 | |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1434-4750 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1434-4742 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11693/50384 | |
dc.language.iso | English | |
dc.publisher | Springer Verlag | |
dc.relation.isversionof | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-018-0211-6 | |
dc.relation.project | Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştirma Kurumu, TÜBITAK | |
dc.source.title | Review of Economic Design | en_US |
dc.subject | Core | en_US |
dc.subject | TU game | en_US |
dc.subject | TU-strong equilibrium | en_US |
dc.subject | TU-α-core | en_US |
dc.subject | TU-β-core | en_US |
dc.title | Every member of the core is as respectful as any other | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
Files
Original bundle
1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
- Name:
- Every_member_of_the_core_is_as_respectful_as_any_other.pdf
- Size:
- 272.31 KB
- Format:
- Adobe Portable Document Format
- Description:
- Full printable version