Equilibrium refinements for the network formation game
buir.contributor.author | İlkılıç, Rahmi | |
buir.contributor.author | İkizler, Hüseyin | |
dc.citation.epage | 25 | en_US |
dc.citation.issueNumber | 1-2 | en_US |
dc.citation.spage | 13 | en_US |
dc.citation.volumeNumber | 23 | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | İlkılıç, Rahmi | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | İkizler, Hüseyin | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-02-20T07:50:45Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-02-20T07:50:45Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019-01 | |
dc.department | Department of Economics | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines a normal form game of network formation due to Myerson (Game theory: analysis of conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991). All players simultaneously announce the links they wish to form. A link is created if and only if there is mutual consent for its formation. The empty network is always a Nash equilibrium of this game. We define a refinement of Nash equilibria that we call trial perfect. We show that the set of networks which can be supported by a pure strategy trial perfect equilibrium coincides with the set of pairwise-Nash equilibrium networks, for games with link-responsive payoff functions. | en_US |
dc.description.provenance | Submitted by Evrim Ergin (eergin@bilkent.edu.tr) on 2020-02-20T07:50:45Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Equilibrium_refinements_for_the_network_formation_game.pdf: 255267 bytes, checksum: 7f3fa0c49e0215f404f27248af359fda (MD5) | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2020-02-20T07:50:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Equilibrium_refinements_for_the_network_formation_game.pdf: 255267 bytes, checksum: 7f3fa0c49e0215f404f27248af359fda (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019-01 | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s10058-019-00218-y | en_US |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1434-4750 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1434-4742 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11693/53445 | |
dc.language.iso | English | en_US |
dc.publisher | Springer | en_US |
dc.relation.isversionof | https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-019-00218-y | en_US |
dc.source.title | Review of Economic Design | en_US |
dc.subject | Networks | en_US |
dc.subject | Network formation | en_US |
dc.subject | Pairwise-stability | en_US |
dc.subject | Equilibrium refinement | en_US |
dc.title | Equilibrium refinements for the network formation game | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
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