Equilibrium refinements for the network formation game

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buir.contributor.authorİlkılıç, Rahmi
buir.contributor.authorİkizler, Hüseyin
dc.citation.epage25en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber1-2en_US
dc.citation.spage13en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber23en_US
dc.contributor.authorİlkılıç, Rahmien_US
dc.contributor.authorİkizler, Hüseyinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-20T07:50:45Z
dc.date.available2020-02-20T07:50:45Z
dc.date.issued2019-01
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines a normal form game of network formation due to Myerson (Game theory: analysis of conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991). All players simultaneously announce the links they wish to form. A link is created if and only if there is mutual consent for its formation. The empty network is always a Nash equilibrium of this game. We define a refinement of Nash equilibria that we call trial perfect. We show that the set of networks which can be supported by a pure strategy trial perfect equilibrium coincides with the set of pairwise-Nash equilibrium networks, for games with link-responsive payoff functions.en_US
dc.description.provenanceSubmitted by Evrim Ergin (eergin@bilkent.edu.tr) on 2020-02-20T07:50:45Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Equilibrium_refinements_for_the_network_formation_game.pdf: 255267 bytes, checksum: 7f3fa0c49e0215f404f27248af359fda (MD5)en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2020-02-20T07:50:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Equilibrium_refinements_for_the_network_formation_game.pdf: 255267 bytes, checksum: 7f3fa0c49e0215f404f27248af359fda (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019-01en
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10058-019-00218-yen_US
dc.identifier.eissn1434-4750
dc.identifier.issn1434-4742
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/53445
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-019-00218-yen_US
dc.source.titleReview of Economic Designen_US
dc.subjectNetworksen_US
dc.subjectNetwork formationen_US
dc.subjectPairwise-stabilityen_US
dc.subjectEquilibrium refinementen_US
dc.titleEquilibrium refinements for the network formation gameen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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