Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria

dc.citation.epage696en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber4en_US
dc.citation.spage679en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber26en_US
dc.contributor.authorKoray, Semih
dc.contributor.authorSertel, M.
dc.contributor.bilkentauthorKoray, Semih
dc.date.accessioned2023-02-17T10:50:50Z
dc.date.available2023-02-17T10:50:50Z
dc.date.issued2022-12
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractDelegation games are studied in the context of a symmetric linear Cournotic duopoly where redelegation is permissible. In the absence of extraneous delegation costs, the following results are demonstrated: (1)Each principal has an incentive to redelegate, increasing the length of his delegation chain.(2)As the length of the delegation chain grows beyond bound, (i)total output at the (Cournot) equilibrium on the industry floor converges in monotonically increasing fashion to the socially efficient one, and(ii)the maximand delegated by each primal delegator converges in monotonically decreasing fashion to the (true) profit function. As a consequence it is suggested that in a linear duopoly context socially efficient and truthful outcomes can be arbitrarily closely approximated by the use of Pretend-but-Perform Mechanisms of order sufficiently large. © 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10058-022-00323-5en_US
dc.identifier.issn1434-4742
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/111502
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00323-5en_US
dc.source.titleReview of Economic Designen_US
dc.titleLimit theorems for recursive delegation equilibriaen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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