Subgame perfect implementation of men-optimal matchings
Date
2017-07
Authors
Editor(s)
Advisor
Koray, Semih
Supervisor
Co-Advisor
Co-Supervisor
Instructor
Source Title
Print ISSN
Electronic ISSN
Publisher
Bilkent University
Volume
Issue
Pages
Language
English
Type
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Series
Abstract
In this study, we explore monotonicities and implementability of di erent matching rules. We nd a self-monotonicity of the stable rule and an h-monotonicity for the men-optimal rule, which does not satisfy Maskin-monotonicity. We then o er a sequential matching mechanism that implements the men-optimal rule in subgame perfect equilibrium, when there is no other matching that weakly Pareto-dominates the men-optimal matching for men. In our mechanism, women propose to men in an arbitrary hierarchy order, and each man either accepts or rejects the proposals he receives, where accepting means permanent matching with the proposing woman.