Kantian equilibria of a class of nash bargaining games

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buir.advisorKaragözoğlu, Emin
dc.contributor.authorDizarlar, Atakan
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-09T07:46:59Z
dc.date.available2021-09-09T07:46:59Z
dc.date.copyright2021-08
dc.date.issued2021-08
dc.date.submitted2021-09-08
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of article.en_US
dc.descriptionThesis (Master's): Bilkent University, Department of Economics, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2021.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (leaves 53-58).en_US
dc.description.abstractThis thesis studies Kantian equilibria (Roemer, 2010) of an n-player bargaining game, which is a modified version of the well-known divide-the-dollar game. It starts with introducing the fundamental concepts of Kantian morality and how Kantian moral theory is captured in economic theory. Then, we first show that the Kantian equilibrium exists under fairly minimal assumptions. Second, if the bankruptcy rule used satisfies equal treatment of equals, and is almost nowhere proportional, then only equal division can prevail in any Kantian equilibrium. On the other hand, we show that an ‘anything goes’ type result emerges only under the proportional rule. Furthermore, using hybrid bankruptcy rules that we construct in a novel fashion, we can characterize the whole equilibrium set. Lastly, we analyse what happens to the equilibrium behavior and the axiomatic properties of the bankruptcy rules under the additive definition of Kantian equilibrium. Our results highlight the interactions between institutions (axiomatic properties of division rules) and agents’ equilibrium behavior.en_US
dc.description.provenanceSubmitted by Betül Özen (ozen@bilkent.edu.tr) on 2021-09-09T07:46:59Z No. of bitstreams: 1 10413840.pdf: 919342 bytes, checksum: 97760ddbdb299d5be246d85a088f73b2 (MD5)en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2021-09-09T07:46:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 10413840.pdf: 919342 bytes, checksum: 97760ddbdb299d5be246d85a088f73b2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2021-08en
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Atakan Dizarlaren_US
dc.format.extentvii, 69 leaves ; 30 cm.en_US
dc.identifier.itemidB156725
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/76504
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectAxiomatic approachen_US
dc.subjectBankruptcy gamesen_US
dc.subjectKantian equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectDivide-the-dollar gameen_US
dc.subjectEqual divisionen_US
dc.subjectKantian moralityen_US
dc.subjectBargainingen_US
dc.subjectEqual divisionen_US
dc.titleKantian equilibria of a class of nash bargaining gamesen_US
dc.title.alternativeBir nash pazarlık oyununda kantiyen dengeleren_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomics
thesis.degree.grantorBilkent University
thesis.degree.levelMaster's
thesis.degree.nameMA (Master of Arts)

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