Implementing egalitarianism in a class of Nash demand games

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buir.contributor.authorKaragözoğlu, Emin
dc.citation.epage508en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3-4en_US
dc.citation.spage495en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber85en_US
dc.contributor.authorKaragözoğlu, Eminen_US
dc.contributor.authorRachmilevitch, S.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-21T16:10:41Z
dc.date.available2019-02-21T16:10:41Z
dc.date.issued2018en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractWe add a stage to Nash’s demand game by allowing the greedier player to revise his demand if the demands are not jointly feasible. If he decides to stick to his initial demand, then the game ends and no one receives anything. If he decides to revise it down to 1 - x, where x is his initial demand, the revised demand is implemented with certainty. The implementation probability changes linearly between these two extreme cases. We derive a condition on the feasible set under which the two-stage game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. In this equilibrium, there is first-stage agreement on the egalitarian demands. We also study two n-player versions of the game. In either version, if the underlying bargaining problem is “divide-the-dollar,” then equal division is sustainable in a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if the number of players is at most four.
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2019-02-21T16:10:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bilkent-research-paper.pdf: 222869 bytes, checksum: 842af2b9bd649e7f548593affdbafbb3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018en
dc.description.sponsorshipAcknowledgements The authors thank an anonymous referee for a helpful report. Emin Karagözog˘lu thanks TÜB˙TAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey) for the post-doctoral research fellowship. Usual disclaimers apply.
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11238-018-9656-x
dc.identifier.eissn1573-7187en_US
dc.identifier.issn0040-5833
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/50516
dc.language.isoEnglish
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-018-9656-x
dc.source.titleTheory and Decisionen_US
dc.subjectDivide-the-dollaren_US
dc.subjectFair divisionen_US
dc.subjectNash demand gameen_US
dc.titleImplementing egalitarianism in a class of Nash demand gamesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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