Shifts in American coercive diplomacy policies through energy weapon

Abstract

This thesis focus on two issues. First, it evaluates the performance of oil as a weapon for coercive diplomacy from the perspective of the United States and its rivals. It investigates three different case studies: Japan 1941, Iran 2005-2015 and 2018- and Venezuela 2014. Second, it looks at how the oil weapon changed throughout time with the new developments in international politics and technology. Here, by focusing on the literature on coercive diplomacy, economic sanctions, and weaponized interdependence, I show how the United States that has the dominant military power, highest oil production capabilities, and the reserve currency combines these capabilities to apply coercion through oil weapon. The results show that oil coercion works when the demands require medium-level political costs for the targeted country. However, if the costs are getting higher, the target country does not comply.