The role of military-industrial complex in foreign policy making: The United States, Saudi Arabia, and arms sale

Abstract

This thesis examines the impact of defense industry lobbying on US foreign policy, focusing on arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Using the global arms transfer data, the research analyzes the role of major defense companies in the US in shaping policy outcomes. The study reviews the intersection of domestic politics, economic interest groups, and foreign policy, emphasizing how lobbying influences the decision-making process. Drawing on data from US Senate lobbying records and Congressional reports, the methodology combines qualitative and quantitative techniques, such as correlation analysis, to assess the relationship between lobbying expenditures and arms sales to Saudi Arabia between 2010 and 2024. As the choice of case, I focused on arms sales with Saudi Arabia during President Trump’s first term, specifically the 2017 deal worth $110 billion. The thesis explores the historical and political context of the US arms deals and defense industry in foreign policy making, then argues that lobbying by defense industries significantly contributes to their actualization. Even though the qualitative findings support the statement, the correlation analysis brings an unexpected outcome. The amount of money spent on lobbying is insignificant in facilitating arms sales to Saudi Arabia, meaning that even if lobbying expenditures go down, sales can increase. However, the number of lobbyists hired and their relations with policymakers indicate a positive correlation with sales.