Simulating the Lausanne Peace negotiations 1922-1923: power asymmetries in bargaining

dc.citation.epage183en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.citation.spage162en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber27en_US
dc.contributor.authorBeriker, N.en_US
dc.contributor.authorDruckman, D.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T10:49:34Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T10:49:34Z
dc.date.issued1996en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of International Relationsen_US
dc.description.abstractThe negotiation leading to the historic Lausanne Peace Treaty provides a setting for exploring the impacts of different power configurations on bargaining behavior. Symmetric and asymmetric coalition structures existed on two key issues in the talks, passage through the straits and the question of civil rights for minorities. A content analysis of the transcripts showed some differences in bargaining behavior between the two power structures. These structures were simulated and compared to a third condition, bilateral negotiations between parties of equal power Opposing negotiators in the symmetric parties condition were more satisfied with the outcome, achieved faster resolutions, disagreed less, and made fewer competitive statements during the discussions than negotiators from these countries in the coalition conditions. Both similarities and differences were found in the comparison between the processes and outcomes in the actual and simulated negotiations. The results have implications for designing structures that improve negotiations and illustrate some advantages of experimental simulation. © 1996 Sage Publications, Inc.en_US
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2016-02-08T10:49:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 bilkent-research-paper.pdf: 70227 bytes, checksum: 26e812c6f5156f83f0e77b261a471b5a (MD5) Previous issue date: 1996en
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/1046878196272003en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1552-826X
dc.identifier.issn1046-8781
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/25724
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherSageen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1046878196272003en_US
dc.source.titleSimulation & Gamingen_US
dc.subjectAlternative power structuresen_US
dc.subjectExperimental simulationen_US
dc.subjectLausanne peace negotiationsen_US
dc.subjectNegotiating behavioren_US
dc.subjectPerceptions and attitudesen_US
dc.subjectProcess analysisen_US
dc.titleSimulating the Lausanne Peace negotiations 1922-1923: power asymmetries in bargainingen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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