Turkish foreign policy towards the Cyprus crises of 1964, 1967, and 1974 : A poliheuristic perspective

Abstract

This thesis analyzes Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus crises of 1964, 1967, and 1974. It summarizes the Cyprus question in the 20th Century. The thesis examines the Cyprus crises and Turkey’s ultimate decisions in each crisis by ‘poliheuristic’ decision making model. The decision making processes of Turkish leaders will be analyzed. By comparing the crises, this thesis studies how Turkish decision makers decided to use force in 1974, whereas refrained from using force against Cyprus in the previous crises of 1964 and 1967. The thesis argues that during each Cyprus crisis, Turkish decision makers framed some of the policy options as ‘noncompensatory’ which resulted in the decision not to intervene in Cyprus during the 1964 and 1967 crises, and resulted in the intervention decision during the 1974 crisis.