(Social) metacognition and (self-)trust

dc.citation.epage	514	en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber	4	en_US
dc.citation.spage	481	en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber	3	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Michaelian, K. H.	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2015-07-28T12:04:24Z
dc.date.available	2015-07-28T12:04:24Z
dc.date.issued	2012	en_US
dc.department	Department of Philosophy	en_US
dc.description.abstract	What entitles you to rely on information received from others? What entitles you to rely on information retrieved from your own memory? Intuitively, you are entitled simply to trust yourself, while you should monitor others for signs of untrustworthiness. This article makes a case for inverting the intuitive view, arguing that metacognitive monitoring of oneself is fundamental to the reliability of memory, while monitoring of others does not play a significant role in ensuring the reliability of testimony.	en_US
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/s13164-012-0099-y	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1878-5158
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11693/13032
dc.language.iso	English	en_US
dc.publisher	Springer Verlag	en_US
dc.relation.isversionof	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0099-y	en_US
dc.source.title	Review of Philosophy and Psychology	en_US
dc.title	(Social) metacognition and (self-)trust	en_US
dc.type	Article	en_US

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