United Nations intervention in Darfur : a case study

Abstract

The crisis in Darfur started in February 2003 as an insurgency movement against the Sudanese government in Khartoum. The response of the ruling party to the uprising became devastating and paved the way to the extreme level of humanitarian suffering. The United Nations has been criticized widely due to its late, reluctant and ineffective response to this humanitarian crisis. This thesis aims to analyze the peace operation in Darfur within the context of the UN interventions in intrastate conflicts. The attitude of the UN in the Darfur crisis is interesting to examine as the case took place in the intersection of two opposite processes. On the one hand, there were significant attempts to regulate the norm of humanitarian intervention and to increase the effectiveness of peace operations. On the other hand, the impact of 9/11 attacks was radically changing the agenda of the world politics. This study tries to assess the intervention on the basis of four questions: How can the basic principles of peacekeeping be applied to that case? Has the AU/UN hybrid operation in Darfur succeeded? What were the reasons for the UN to respond lately and reluctantly in Darfur? How can the case be evaluated within the context of humanitarian interventions? In the final analysis, this thesis argues that despite the fact that significant normative progress has been achieved in rhetoric especially in notion of sacrificing state sovereignty for the sake of human security, the practice is still shaped by the political calculations of member states.