The “Buying time” concept in Southeast Asia: security and development in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, 1967–1975

Abstract

In 1967, the U.K. and in 1969, the U.S. announced plans to phase out their military presence in Southeast Asia. This dissertation examines the reactions of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) states–Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia–to the impending withdrawal of ANZUK (Australia, New Zealand, U.K.) and U.S. military forces from Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. It argues that by adopting the buying time concept–urging the U.S. and ANZUK to maintain their economic, military, and political presence in Southeast Asia to buy time to develop their economies–Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia upheld and legitimized a regional power structure dominated by the U.S. Throughout the Vietnam War, they pursued foreign policies advocating for extra-regional interference in Southeast Asia through economic and military assistance. They endorsed the FPDA (Five Power Defense Arrangements) to prevent Chinese and Soviet influence and competition in Southeast Asia while supporting U.S. military intervention and presence in Vietnam and Thailand. Consequently, with the exception of Malaysia, the U.S. war effort in Vietnam significantly contributed to the economic development of Singapore and Indonesia. In the cases of Singapore and Indonesia, the progress in development resulted from pro-U.S. political elites participating in a global economic network of multinational corporations and international financial institutions. This research challenges the conventional view that Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia were nonaligned and neutral states in pursuit of regional autonomy. It provides an analysis that accounts for the historical agency of developing nations in Southeast Asia in bolstering a U.S.-led international order.