Two essays in social choice theory
buir.advisor | Koray, Semih | |
dc.contributor.author | Kaya, Ayça | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-01-08T20:17:42Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-01-08T20:17:42Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2000 | |
dc.description | Ankara : The Department of Economics, Bilkent University, 2000. | en_US |
dc.description | Thesis (Master's) -- Bilkent University, 2000. | en_US |
dc.description | Includes bibliographical references leaves 36-37. | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | Solution concepts which implement only monotonic social choice rules are characterized in terms of a new notion of monotonicity pertaining to solution concepts. For any given class G of mechanisms, it turns out that a solution concept a implements only monotonic social choice rules via mechanisms in G if and only if a is G-monotonic. Moreover, with each solution concept a, we associate a class G^ of mechanisms such that each a-implementable onto social choice function which takes on at least three different values is dictatorial if and only if a is Go-monotonic. Oligarchic social choice rules are characterized by the conjunction of unanimity and a monotonicity condition, oligarchic monotonicity, which is stronger than Maskin monotonicity. Given an oligarchic social choice rule, the coalition acting as the oligarchy turns out to be the minimal set T of agents such that the social choice mle is Maskin monotonic when the restriction of each profile to T is considered. Finally, the solution concepts which implement only oligarchic social choice rules are characterized in terms of oligarchic monotonicity modified for solution concepts. | en_US |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2016-01-08T20:17:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 1.pdf: 78510 bytes, checksum: d85492f20c2362aa2bcf4aad49380397 (MD5) | en |
dc.description.statementofresponsibility | Kaya, Ayça | en_US |
dc.format.extent | vi, 37 leaves | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11693/18255 | |
dc.language.iso | English | en_US |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en_US |
dc.subject | Social Choice | en_US |
dc.subject | Oligarchy | en_US |
dc.subject | Dictatoriality | en_US |
dc.subject | Monotonicity | en_US |
dc.subject | Implementation | en_US |
dc.subject.lcc | HB846.8 .K39 2000 | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Social choice. | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Economic policy. | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Social choice--Mathematical models. | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Authoritarianism. | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Political sociology. | en_US |
dc.title | Two essays in social choice theory | en_US |
dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
thesis.degree.discipline | Economics | |
thesis.degree.grantor | Bilkent University | |
thesis.degree.level | Master's | |
thesis.degree.name | MA (Master of Arts) |
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