Opportunism and the dynamics of the incomplete contracts

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dc.citation.epage683en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.citation.spage663en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber34en_US
dc.contributor.authorBac, M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-13T07:03:19Z
dc.date.available2019-02-13T07:03:19Z
dc.date.issued1993en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies a buyer-seller relationship where "quality" is not contractible but is affected by effort and the seller's privately known innate value. The seller's cost of effort is also private knowledge. Assuming constant outside opportunities, we show that more than two contracts is redundant, the sequence of contracts exhibits increasing prices and durations, and commit- ments for prices beyond the actual contract invite opportunism, not effort. The seller uses effort during the screening process, which improves noncontract- ible quality. As a result, type-related information may have negative value when contracts are incomplete.en_US
dc.description.provenanceSubmitted by Şelale Korkut (selale@bilkent.edu.tr) on 2019-02-13T07:03:19Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Opportunism_and_the_dynamics_of_the_incomplete_contracts.pdf: 643559 bytes, checksum: e33dc628c191d8122dc2f7235a5fc6d0 (MD5)en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2019-02-13T07:03:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Opportunism_and_the_dynamics_of_the_incomplete_contracts.pdf: 643559 bytes, checksum: e33dc628c191d8122dc2f7235a5fc6d0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1993en
dc.identifier.doi10.2307/2527187en_US
dc.identifier.issn0020-6598
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/49375
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.2307/2527187en_US
dc.source.titleInternational Economic Reviewen_US
dc.titleOpportunism and the dynamics of the incomplete contractsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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