The coauthors' problem revisited : from networks to covers

In this thesis, we reexamine the Coauthors’ Problem, introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996. We propose the Extended Coauthor Model using the cover notion, allowing for multilateral links among authors. We study the model under two utility functions, which are the extreme members of the class of utility functions induced by different synergy terms. We find the structure of the efficient and the link-wise stable covers formed under different utility functions, which depend on the synergy term under consideration. Moreover we introduce the core and core stability concepts for covers and investigate the properties possessed by core-stable covers. We find the relationship between the allocation induced by core-stable covers and the allocations in core, under player based flexible allocation rule. Finally we investigate the endogenous cover formation via a strategic form game, called the hyper-link formation game. We define Nash stability and Strong Nash stability for covers and study the characteristics of such covers.