Analyzing strategic behavior in a dynamic model of bargaining and war

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buir.contributor.authorDoğan, Serhat
buir.contributor.authorSağlam, Çağrı
buir.contributor.orcidSağlam, Çağrı|0000-0002-7123-9575
dc.citation.epage257en_US
dc.citation.spage233
dc.citation.volumeNumber140
dc.contributor.authorDoğan, Serhat
dc.contributor.authorKeskin, K.
dc.contributor.authorSağlam, Çağrı
dc.date.accessioned2024-03-11T13:02:35Z
dc.date.available2024-03-11T13:02:35Z
dc.date.issued2023-09-19
dc.departmentDepartment of Economics
dc.description.abstractWe analyze a dynamic model of bargaining and war with two states located on a linear territory. One state demands a portion of the other state’s territory each period such that if the latter state makes a concession, the former state takes control of the demanded portion. If otherwise, the two states engage in warfare to decide which state controls the disputed portion of territory. À la Fearon, we consider a model in which the states bargain over objects that influence future bargaining power. That is, it is valuable to have more territory, not only because it brings higher utility, but also because it increases future bargaining power, as it can be used to generate military resources in wars to come. We implicitly characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium of the model, and utilizing a set of parameter values, we illustrate that there are six different types of equilibrium outcomes. We then provide a variety of historical examples and argue that our model is able to capture their patterns and characteristics.
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00712-023-00838-7
dc.identifier.eissn1617-7134
dc.identifier.issn0931-8658
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11693/114516
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-023-00838-7
dc.rightsCC BY
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.source.titleJournal of Economics
dc.subjectBargaining
dc.subjectConflict resolution
dc.subjectDynamic models
dc.subjectFuture bargaining power
dc.subjectHistorical examples
dc.subjectStrategic behavior
dc.subjectWarfare
dc.titleAnalyzing strategic behavior in a dynamic model of bargaining and war
dc.typeArticle

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