The n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations

Date
2011
Authors
Akin, S.N.
Platt, B.C.
Sertel, M.R.
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Supervisor
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Source Title
Review of Economic Design
Print ISSN
14344742
Electronic ISSN
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Volume
15
Issue
2
Pages
147 - 162
Language
English
Type
Article
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Abstract

This study examines the behavior of simple n-person bargaining problems under pre-donations where the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution is operant. Predonations are a unilateral commitment to transfer a portion of one's utility to someone else, and are used to distort the bargaining set and thereby influence the bargaining solution. In equilibrium, these pre-donations are Pareto-improving over the undistorted solution; moreover, when the agents' preferences are sufficiently distinct, the equilibrium solution coincides with the concessionary division rule. © 2010 Springer-Verlag.

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Keywords
Bargaining, Concession, Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, Pre-donation
Citation
Published Version (Please cite this version)