Learning in Bayesian regulation: desirable or undesirable?

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dc.citation.epage10en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber12en_US
dc.citation.spage1en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber3en_US
dc.contributor.authorKoray, S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSaglam, I.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T10:14:38Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T10:14:38Z
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractWe examine the social desirability of learning about the regulated agent in a generalized principal-agent model with incomplete information. An interesting result we obtain is that there are situations in which the agent prefers a Bayesian regulator to have more, yet incomplete, information about his private type.en_US
dc.identifier.issn1545-2921
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/23488
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherEconomics Bulletinen_US
dc.source.titleEconomics Bulletinen_US
dc.titleLearning in Bayesian regulation: desirable or undesirable?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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