Nonexclusive competition for a freelancer under adverse selection

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buir.contributor.authorBayrak, Halil İbrahim
buir.contributor.authorDalkıran, Nuh Aygün
buir.contributor.orcidBayrak, Halil İbrahim|0000-0002-7134-0833
buir.contributor.orcidDalkıran, Nuh Aygün|0000-0002-0586-0355
dc.citation.epage102773- 12en_US
dc.citation.spage102773- 1en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber103en_US
dc.contributor.authorBayrak, Halil İbrahim
dc.contributor.authorDalkıran, Nuh Aygün
dc.date.accessioned2023-02-14T10:29:53Z
dc.date.available2023-02-14T10:29:53Z
dc.date.issued2022-09-30
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Industrial Engineeringen_US
dc.description.abstractA freelancer with a time constraint faces offers from multiple identical parties. The quality of the service provided by the freelancer can be high or low and is only known by the freelancer. The freelancer’s time cost is strictly increasing and convex. We show that a pure-strategy equilibrium exists if and only if the preferences of the high-type freelancer satisfy one of the following two distinct conditions: the high-type freelancer does not prefer providing his services for a price equal to the expected quality at the no-trade point; the high-type freelancer prefers providing his services for a price equal to the expected quality at any feasible trade point. If holds, then in equilibrium, the high-type freelancer does not trade, whereas the low-type may not trade, may trade efficiently, or may exhaust all of his capacity. Moreover, the buyers make zero profit from each of their traded contracts. If holds, then both types of the freelancer trade at the capacity in equilibrium. Furthermore, the buyers make zero expected profit with cross-subsidization. In any equilibrium, the aggregate equilibrium trades are unique. Our results extend to the case where the freelancer has more than two types if the buyers are restricted to offering concave tariffs.en_US
dc.description.provenanceSubmitted by Ezgi Uğurlu (ezgi.ugurlu@bilkent.edu.tr) on 2023-02-14T10:29:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Nonexclusive_competition_for_a_freelancer_under_adverse_selection.pdf: 453406 bytes, checksum: c1b64ebdfa640e3544c60e5d5b2d01ec (MD5)en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2023-02-14T10:29:53Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Nonexclusive_competition_for_a_freelancer_under_adverse_selection.pdf: 453406 bytes, checksum: c1b64ebdfa640e3544c60e5d5b2d01ec (MD5) Previous issue date: 2022-09-30en
dc.embargo.release2024-09-30
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102773en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1873-1538
dc.identifier.issn0304-4068
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/111250
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherElsevier BVen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102773en_US
dc.source.titleJournal of Mathematical Economicsen_US
dc.subjectAdverse selectionen_US
dc.subjectCompeting mechanismsen_US
dc.subjectNonexclusivityen_US
dc.subjectLabor marketsen_US
dc.titleNonexclusive competition for a freelancer under adverse selectionen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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