General complementarities on complete partial orders

dc.citation.epage1en_US
dc.citation.spage12en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber2014en_US
dc.contributor.authorKeskin, K.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSağlam, H. Ç.en_US
dc.contributor.authorTuran, A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-28T12:01:46Z
dc.date.available2015-07-28T12:01:46Z
dc.date.issued2014en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper proves the existence of a Nash equilibrium for extended (semi-) uniform g-modular games, i.e., non-cooperative games where the strategy space is a complete partially ordered set, and the best reply correspondence satisfies certain monotonicity requirements.en_US
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2015-07-28T12:01:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 7944.pdf: 334783 bytes, checksum: 37079d41274dcc26bdf6fe1ce879a723 (MD5)en
dc.identifier.doi10.1186/1687-1812-2014-101en_US
dc.identifier.issn1687-1820
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/12517
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherSpringer International Publishingen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1687-1812-2014-101en_US
dc.source.titleFixed Point Theory and Applicationsen_US
dc.subjectGeneral complementaritiesen_US
dc.subjectUniform modularityen_US
dc.subjectComplete partial orderen_US
dc.subjectFixed point theoryen_US
dc.titleGeneral complementarities on complete partial ordersen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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