Baker’s theory of material constitution and thinking things into existence

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dc.citation.epage56en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber4en_US
dc.citation.spage49en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber26en_US
dc.contributor.authorKiymaz, Tufanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-21T16:08:08Z
dc.date.available2019-02-21T16:08:08Z
dc.date.issued2018en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.description.abstractThe paper provides a critical evaluation of Lynne Rudder Baker’s nonmereological theory of material constitution in light of the “thinking into existence” objection, formulated by Theodore Sider and Dean W. Zimmerman. Although Baker responds to it, she focuses on its specific versions presented by Sider and Zimmerman and does not address the source of the problem. Baker maintains that beliefs, social practices, and conventions can bring a new intention-dependent object into existence. However, as I argue, the thinking into existence objection shows that constituted objects, if there are any, are ontologically independent of beliefs, social practices, and conventions. In fact, Baker’s theory doesn’t give us any reason for believing that intentiondependent objects are any more real than fictional objects.
dc.identifier.doi10.14394/filnau.2018.0023
dc.identifier.issn1230-6894
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/50400
dc.language.isoEnglish
dc.publisherUniversity of Warsaw, Institute of Philosophy
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2018.0023
dc.source.titleFilozofia Naukien_US
dc.subjectFictional objectsen_US
dc.subjectMaterial constitutionen_US
dc.subjectOntologyen_US
dc.subjectThinking into existenceen_US
dc.titleBaker’s theory of material constitution and thinking things into existenceen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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