Macroprudentials : separate from monetary policy or part of it?

buir.advisorBöke, Selin Sayek
dc.contributor.authorTopaloğlu, Meltem
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-08T18:20:00Z
dc.date.available2016-01-08T18:20:00Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.descriptionAnkara : The Department of Economics, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2012.en_US
dc.descriptionThesis (Master's) -- Bilkent University, 2012.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references leaves 51-53.en_US
dc.description.abstractThe structure of central bank in bank supervision is an important issue on which there is not much focus whereas the independence of central banks for the implementation of monetary policy is well investigated. Recently, especially after the financial crisis, there is an increasing attention from policy makers and academicians about financial regulation and monetary policy responsibility issue. Since the crisis turned to have severe macroeconomic consequences, the financial supervision issue is taken into consideration to revise. In this paper, first I briefly explain the policy objectives of both macroand microprudential regulations. Then, I use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model which include separated and integrated responsibilities of financial stability and monetary policy. As macroprudential policy tool, time varying capital requirement ratio is used. Under a DSGE framework, it is hard to see the separation of regulators, however the analyses is done in terms of tools. The results imply that incorporating the central bank into financial stability considerations can help smooth business cycle fluctuations, and decreases the loss resulting from variances of main indicators.en_US
dc.description.degreeM.A.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityTopaloğlu, Meltemen_US
dc.format.extentvii, 59 leavesen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/15533
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherBilkent Universityen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectMacroprudential policyen_US
dc.subjectmonetary policyen_US
dc.subjectDSGE modelen_US
dc.subject.lccHG1725 .T67 2012en_US
dc.subject.lcshBanks and banking--State supervision.en_US
dc.subject.lcshMonetary policy.en_US
dc.subject.lcshFinancial crises.en_US
dc.subject.lcshBanks and banking, Central.en_US
dc.titleMacroprudentials : separate from monetary policy or part of it?en_US
dc.typeThesisen_US

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