Iterated egalitarian compromise solution to bargaining problems and midpoint domination

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buir.contributor.authorKaragözoğlu, Emin
buir.contributor.authorTok, Elif Özcan
dc.citation.epage285en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.citation.spage282en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber46en_US
dc.contributor.authorKaragözoğlu, Eminen_US
dc.contributor.authorTok, Elif Özcanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-21T16:01:54Z
dc.date.available2019-02-21T16:01:54Z
dc.date.issued2018en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractWe introduce a new solution for two-person bargaining problems: the iterated egalitarian compromise solution. It is defined by using two prominent bargaining solutions, the egalitarian solution (Kalai, 1977) and the equal-loss solution (Chun, 1988), in an iterative fashion. While neither of these two solutions satisfy midpoint domination - an appealing normative property - we show that the iterated egalitarian compromise solution does so.
dc.description.sponsorshipThe authors thank an anonymous reviewer for constructive comments, which improved the paper. They also thank Serhat Doğan, Aurelian Gheondea, Tarık Kara, Selman Erol, and Shiran Rachmilevitch for fruitful discussions and valuable comments. Emin Karagözoğlu thanks TÜBİTAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey) for the post-doctoral research fellowship, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics for their hospitality. Usual disclaimers apply.
dc.embargo.release2020-05-01en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.orl.2018.02.005
dc.identifier.issn0167-6377
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/49936
dc.language.isoEnglish
dc.publisherElsevier B.V.
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2018.02.005
dc.relation.projectDepartment of Economics, University of Oxford - Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MIT
dc.source.titleOperations Research Lettersen_US
dc.subjectAxiomsen_US
dc.subjectBargaining problemen_US
dc.subjectEgalitarianismen_US
dc.subjectMidpoint dominationen_US
dc.subjectRandomized dictatorshipen_US
dc.titleIterated egalitarian compromise solution to bargaining problems and midpoint dominationen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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