Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints

Date
2012
Authors
Bochet, O.
İlkılıç, R.
Moulin, H.
Sethuraman, J.
Advisor
Supervisor
Co-Advisor
Co-Supervisor
Instructor
Source Title
Theoretical Economics
Print ISSN
1933-6837
Electronic ISSN
1555-7561
Publisher
Econometric Society
Volume
7
Issue
3
Pages
395 - 423
Language
English
Type
Article
Journal Title
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Volume Title
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Abstract

In a moneyless market, a nondisposable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked. The links form an arbitrary bipartite graph. Typically, supply is short in one segment of the market, while demand is short in another. Our egalitarian transfer solution generalizes Sprumont's (1991) and Klaus et al.'s (1998) uniform allocation rules. It rations only the long side in each market segment, equalizing the net transfers of rationed agents as much as permitted by the bilateral constraints. It elicits a truthful report of both preferences and links: removing a feasible link is never profitable to either one of its two agents. Together with efficiency and a version of equal treatment of equals, these properties are characteristic.

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Book Title
Keywords
Bipartite graph, Bilateral trade, Strategy-proofness, Equal treatment of equals, Single-peaked preferences
Citation
Published Version (Please cite this version)