Oppressed patron, free client? how can de facto states enjoy a more liberal and democratic regime than their patron states?

Abstract

This dissertation examines how some unrecognized (de facto) states sustain more democratic freedoms than their patron states despite heavy dependence. Using a comparative case study of Northern Cyprus and Abkhazia—client states of Turkey and Russia, respectively—it asks whether de facto states simply conform to patron–client expectations or exhibit meaningful divergence. The study finds that although both cases depend on patrons for economic, diplomatic, and security support, they assert political agency and maintain cultures that diverge from, and even surpass, their patrons in pluralism and civil liberties. Northern Cyprus leverages established institutions, vibrant civil society, and EU links (via Republic of Cyprus citizenship) to preserve pluralistic democracy, while Abkhazia relies on strong community oversight and traditions of avoiding direct state–society confrontation to retain political openness under Russian influence. Moreover, the study extends patron–client theory to de facto statehood by incorporating three key factors: client resilience, patron side restraint, and direct and indirect roles of parent states. By foregrounding triangular interactions among patron, client, and parent, it revisits conventional patron–client relations, specifying when and how asymmetric ties are negotiated, bounded, or rebalanced in contested entities.