Silencing the argument from hallucination

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dc.citation.epage270en_US
dc.citation.spage255en_US
dc.contributor.authorAranyosi, Istvanen_US
dc.contributor.editorMacpherson, F.
dc.contributor.editorPlatchias, D.
dc.date.accessioned2019-04-29T11:17:50Z
dc.date.available2019-04-29T11:17:50Z
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.descriptionChapter 11en_US
dc.description.abstractOrdinary people tend to be realists regarding perceptual experience, that is, they take perceiving the environment as a direct, unmediated, straightforward access to a mindindependent reality. Not so for (ordinary) philosophers. The empiricist influence on the philosophy of perception, in analytic philosophy at least, made the problem of perception synonymous with the view that realism is untenable. Admitting the problem (and trying to offer a view on it) is tantamount to rejecting ordinary people’s implicit realist assumptions as naive. So what exactly is the problem? We can approach it via one of the central arguments against realism – the argument from hallucination. The argument is intended as a proof that in ordinary, veridical cases of perception, perceivers do not have an unmediated perceptual access to the world. There are many versions of it; I propose the following1: 1. Hallucinations that are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptions are possible. 2. If two subjective states are indistinguishable, then they have a common nature. 3. The contents of hallucinations are mental images, not concrete external objects. 4. Therefore, the contents of veridical perceptions are mental images rather than concrete external objects. The key move is, I believe, from the fact that hallucinations that are subjectively indistinguishable from cases of veridical perception are possible to an alleged common element, factor, or nature, in the form of a mental state, in the two cases – that is, premise 2. Disjunctivism, at its core, can be taken as simply denying this move, and arguing that all that follows from the premise stating the possibility of hallucinations that are subjectively indistinguishable from cases veridical perception is that there is a broader category, that of “experience as of...”, which encompasses both cases..en_US
dc.description.provenanceSubmitted by Zeynep Aykut (zeynepay@bilkent.edu.tr) on 2019-04-29T11:17:50Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Silencing_the_argument_from_hallucination.pdf: 77757 bytes, checksum: 5a3838bee3bcf1edd4631041ebd2ea8c (MD5)en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2019-04-29T11:17:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silencing_the_argument_from_hallucination.pdf: 77757 bytes, checksum: 5a3838bee3bcf1edd4631041ebd2ea8c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013en
dc.identifier.doi10.7551/mitpress/9780262019200.003.0011en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.7551/mitpress/9780262019200.001.0001en_US
dc.identifier.eisbn9780262315050
dc.identifier.isbn9780262019200
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/51007
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherMIT Pressen_US
dc.relation.ispartofHallucination: philosophy and psychologyen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262019200.003.0011en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262019200.001.0001en_US
dc.subjectHallucinationen_US
dc.subjectSilenceen_US
dc.subjectPerceptionen_US
dc.subjectAbsencesen_US
dc.titleSilencing the argument from hallucinationen_US
dc.typeBook Chapteren_US

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