On the influence of hard leverage in a soft leverage bargaining game: the importance of credible claims

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dc.citation.epage179en_US
dc.citation.spage164en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber99en_US
dc.contributor.authorBolton, G. E.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKaragözoğlu, E.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-12T10:54:59Z
dc.date.available2018-04-12T10:54:59Zen_US
dc.date.issued2016en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractWhat makes a bargaining proposal credible? We study how hard leverage (binding commitment) influences soft leverage (appealing to a focal point) in a rich-context bargaining game known to exhibit competing claims to focality. In three treatments, our experiment varies one bargainer's ability to commit, holding the soft leverage condition fixed. As in previous studies, we observe that opening offers are consistent with the available soft leverage. The influence of hard leverage is most evident in the concessionary stage. Hard and soft leverage interact to influence outcomes: Hard leverage advantages its holder, yet settlements largely stay between the two focal points. We posit that focal points induce mutual expectations of bargainer social preferences that, when combined with the Nash bargaining solution, imply the comparative statics concerning the settlements observed. A similarly modified version of the Zeuthen–Harsanyi model of the bargaining process, agrees with the comparative statics on opening offers and concessions. © 2016 Elsevier Inc.en_US
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2018-04-12T10:54:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 bilkent-research-paper.pdf: 179475 bytes, checksum: ea0bedeb05ac9ccfb983c327e155f0c2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.005en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1090-2473
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/36834en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherAcademic Pressen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.005en_US
dc.source.titleGames and Economic Behavioren_US
dc.subjectBargainingen_US
dc.subjectCredibilityen_US
dc.subjectExperimentsen_US
dc.subjectHard leverageen_US
dc.subjectSoft leverageen_US
dc.titleOn the influence of hard leverage in a soft leverage bargaining game: the importance of credible claimsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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