Browsing by Subject "Team contests"

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    Bribing in team contests
    (Elsevier, 2021-04-21) Doğan, Serhat; Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, K.; Sağlam, Çağrı
    We study bribing in a sequential team contest with multiple pairwise battles. Allowing for asymmetries in winning prizes and marginal costs of effort, we present the conditions under which (i) a player in a team is offered a bribe by the owner of the other team and (ii) she accepts that bribe. We show that these conditions depend on the ratios of players’ winning prizes and marginal costs of effort: the team owner chooses to bribe the player with the most favorable winning prize to marginal cost of effort ratio, and offers a bribe that leaves her indifferent between accepting (and exerting zero effort) and rejecting (and exerting her optimal effort). In some cases, the competition between players and the negative consequences of one player receiving a bribe on the team performance can drag down the equilibrium bribe to zero. We also study the impact of changes in winning prizes and marginal costs of effort on the equilibrium bribing behavior.
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    Sabotage in team contests
    (Springer, 2019) Doğan, Serhat; Keskin, K.; Sağlam, Çağrı
    In the contest literature, sabotage is defined as a deliberate and costly activity that damages the opponent’s likelihood of winning the contest. Most of the existing results suggest that, anticipating a possible sabotage, contestants would be discouraged from exerting high efforts. In this paper we investigate the act of sabotage in a team contest wherein team members exert costly efforts as a contribution to their team’s aggregate effort, which in turn determines the contest’s outcome. For the baseline model with no sabotage, there exists a corner equilibrium implying a free-rider problem in each team. As for the model with sabotage, our characterization of Nash equilibrium reveals two important results: (i) a unique interior equilibrium exists so that the free-rider problem no longer is a concern and (ii) the discouragement effect of sabotage vanishes for some players. On top of those conclusions, we investigate the team owner’s problems of prize allocation and team formation with the objective being to maximize his team’s winning probability.