Browsing by Subject "Strategy-proofness"

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2

Open Access
Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints
(Econometric Society, 2012) Bochet, O.; İlkılıç, R.; Moulin, H.; Sethuraman, J.
In a moneyless market, a nondisposable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked. The links form an arbitrary bipartite graph. Typically, supply is short in one segment of the market, while demand is short in another. Our egalitarian transfer solution generalizes Sprumont's (1991) and Klaus et al.'s (1998) uniform allocation rules. It rations only the long side in each market segment, equalizing the net transfers of rationed agents as much as permitted by the bilateral constraints. It elicits a truthful report of both preferences and links: removing a feasible link is never profitable to either one of its two agents. Together with efficiency and a version of equal treatment of equals, these properties are characteristic.
Open Access
Self-selective social choice functions verify arrow and gibbard-satterthwaite theorems
(Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2000) Koray, S.
This paper introduces a new notion of consistency for social choice functions, called self-selectivity, which requires that a social choice function employed by a society to make a choice from a given alternative set it faces should choose itself from among other rival such functions when it is employed by the society to make this latter choice as well. A unanimous neutral social choice function turns out to be universally self-selective if and only if it is Paretian and satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives. The neutral unanimous social choice functions whose domains consist of linear order profiles on nonempty sets of any finite cardinality induce a class of social welfare functions that inherit Paretianism and independence of irrelevant alternatives in case the social choice function with which one starts is universally self-selective. Thus, a unanimous and neutral social choice function is universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. Moreover, universal self-selectivity for such functions is equivalent to the conjunction of strategy-proofness and independence of irrelevant alternatives or the conjunction of monotonicity and independence of irrelevant alternatives again.