Browsing by Subject "Social networks--Economic aspects."

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    The coauthors' problem revisited : from networks to covers
    (2010) Mermer, Ayşe Gül
    In this thesis, we reexamine the Coauthors’ Problem, introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996. We propose the Extended Coauthor Model using the cover notion, allowing for multilateral links among authors. We study the model under two utility functions, which are the extreme members of the class of utility functions induced by different synergy terms. We find the structure of the efficient and the link-wise stable covers formed under different utility functions, which depend on the synergy term under consideration. Moreover we introduce the core and core stability concepts for covers and investigate the properties possessed by core-stable covers. We find the relationship between the allocation induced by core-stable covers and the allocations in core, under player based flexible allocation rule. Finally we investigate the endogenous cover formation via a strategic form game, called the hyper-link formation game. We define Nash stability and Strong Nash stability for covers and study the characteristics of such covers.
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    Extension of symmetric connections model
    (2010) Taşcıer, Mehpare Şule
    In this thesis, we study an extension of symmetric connections model, which is presented by Matthew O. Jackson and Asher Wolinsky in their paper entitled, “A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks”. We examined the network formation process through a dynamic framework where self-interested individuals can form links, then we analyze to which network structures this process converges.
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    Stability of covers under different rights structures
    (2012) Akbulut, Çiğdem
    A countryís social welfare depends on Örmsí proÖts and consumersí surplus. Given unions of countries, a countryís aim is to maximize its own social welfare when it decides to enter or exit a union. For examining unions, we use the notion of a cover as elaborated in Koray (2007).We utilize the Öndings of Ilk¨l¨Á · (2010) about the Cournot equilibrium in our setting to examine core stability and e¢ ciency of covers of countries.We adapt di§erent rightsístructures based on; free exit, free entry, approved exit and approved entry introduced by Sertel (1992) to the context of covers, along with introducing some stronger structures and study how stability of covers varies when linkage costs are imposed upon countries.