Browsing by Subject "Noncooperative game"
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Item Open Access Consensus as a Nash equilibrium of a dynamic game(IEEE, 2016) Niazi, Muhammad Umar B.; Özgüler, Arif Bülent; Yıldız, AykutConsensus formation in a social network is modeled by a dynamic game of a prescribed duration played by members of the network. Each member independently minimizes a cost function that represents his/her motive. An integral cost function penalizes a member's differences of opinion from the others as well as from his/her own initial opinion, weighted by influence and stubbornness parameters. Each member uses its rate of change of opinion as a control input. This defines a dynamic non-cooperative game that turns out to have a unique Nash equilibrium. Analytic explicit expressions are derived for the opinion trajectory of each member for two representative cases obtained by suitable assumptions on the graph topology of the network. These trajectories are then examined under different assumptions on the relative sizes of the influence and stubbornness parameters that appear in the cost functions.Item Open Access Water alliances in the Euphrates-Tigris basin(Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999) Güner, Serdar S.; Lonergan, S. C.This chapter investigates possible alliances between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq in their dispute over water in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. A noncooperative game in extensive form models Turkish-Syrian interactions related to water and terrorism. Iraq is modeled as a dummy player having no choice in the game but benefiting from Turkish-Syrian concessions. A Turkish-Syrian alliance cannot target Iraq, as the latter has no means of reducing the water volume upstream. The equilibria of the game explain the current state of the conflict by providing two different rationales. A unique equilibrium stipulates the conditions for a Turkish- Syrian cooperation. Turkish-Iraqi and Syrian-Iraqi alliances are found to be formed to balance threats in the basin.