BUIR logo
Communities & Collections
All of BUIR
  • English
  • Türkçe
Log In
Please note that log in via username/password is only available to Repository staff.
Have you forgotten your password?
  1. Home
  2. Browse by Subject

Browsing by Subject "Noncooperative game"

Filter results by typing the first few letters
Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Results Per Page
  • Sort Options
  • Loading...
    Thumbnail Image
    ItemOpen Access
    Consensus as a Nash equilibrium of a dynamic game
    (IEEE, 2016) Niazi, Muhammad Umar B.; Özgüler, Arif Bülent; Yıldız, Aykut
    Consensus formation in a social network is modeled by a dynamic game of a prescribed duration played by members of the network. Each member independently minimizes a cost function that represents his/her motive. An integral cost function penalizes a member's differences of opinion from the others as well as from his/her own initial opinion, weighted by influence and stubbornness parameters. Each member uses its rate of change of opinion as a control input. This defines a dynamic non-cooperative game that turns out to have a unique Nash equilibrium. Analytic explicit expressions are derived for the opinion trajectory of each member for two representative cases obtained by suitable assumptions on the graph topology of the network. These trajectories are then examined under different assumptions on the relative sizes of the influence and stubbornness parameters that appear in the cost functions.
  • Loading...
    Thumbnail Image
    ItemOpen Access
    Water alliances in the Euphrates-Tigris basin
    (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999) Güner, Serdar S.; Lonergan, S. C.
    This chapter investigates possible alliances between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq in their dispute over water in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. A noncooperative game in extensive form models Turkish-Syrian interactions related to water and terrorism. Iraq is modeled as a dummy player having no choice in the game but benefiting from Turkish-Syrian concessions. A Turkish-Syrian alliance cannot target Iraq, as the latter has no means of reducing the water volume upstream. The equilibria of the game explain the current state of the conflict by providing two different rationales. A unique equilibrium stipulates the conditions for a Turkish- Syrian cooperation. Turkish-Iraqi and Syrian-Iraqi alliances are found to be formed to balance threats in the basin.

About the University

  • Academics
  • Research
  • Library
  • Students
  • Stars
  • Moodle
  • WebMail

Using the Library

  • Collections overview
  • Borrow, renew, return
  • Connect from off campus
  • Interlibrary loan
  • Hours
  • Plan
  • Intranet (Staff Only)

Research Tools

  • EndNote
  • Grammarly
  • iThenticate
  • Mango Languages
  • Mendeley
  • Turnitin
  • Show more ..

Contact

  • Bilkent University
  • Main Campus Library
  • Phone: +90(312) 290-1298
  • Email: dspace@bilkent.edu.tr

Bilkent University Library © 2015-2025 BUIR

  • Privacy policy
  • Send Feedback