Browsing by Subject "Non-cooperative games"

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    Delegation in a duopolistic differentiated goods market with Bertrand competition
    (1995) Yıldırım, Hüseyin
    The impact of delegation in a firm has been observed by many modern authors. Vickers(1985), Fershtman and Judd(1987), Sklivas(1987) considered the problem as part of positive economic theory whereas Koray and Sertel(1989) treated it as a regulation problem. We examine a similar problem for a duopolistic dilTerentiated good market with Bertrand competition and lengthen the delegation chain to 5 managers. Our findings show that the firms’ profits are monotonically increasing, i.e. there is a positive incentive to redelegate for each firm. Our natural conjecture is that, in the limit, firms reach collusion non-cooperatively.
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    A private contributions game for joint replenishment
    (2012) Körpeoǧlu, E.; Şen, A.; Güler, K.
    We study a non-cooperative game for joint replenishment by n firms that operate under an EOQ-like setting. Each firm decides whether to replenish independently or to participate in joint replenishment, and how much to contribute to joint ordering costs in case of participation. Joint replenishment cycle time is set by an intermediary as the lowest cycle time that can be financed with the private contributions of participating firms. We characterize the behavior and outcomes under undominated Nash equilibria.