A private contributions game for joint replenishment

Date

2012

Authors

Körpeoǧlu, E.
Şen, A.
Güler, K.

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Source Title

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research

Print ISSN

1432-2994

Electronic ISSN

1432-5217

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Volume

75

Issue

1

Pages

67 - 82

Language

English

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Abstract

We study a non-cooperative game for joint replenishment by n firms that operate under an EOQ-like setting. Each firm decides whether to replenish independently or to participate in joint replenishment, and how much to contribute to joint ordering costs in case of participation. Joint replenishment cycle time is set by an intermediary as the lowest cycle time that can be financed with the private contributions of participating firms. We characterize the behavior and outcomes under undominated Nash equilibria.

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