A private contributions game for joint replenishment

Date
2012
Authors
Körpeoǧlu, E.
Şen, A.
Güler, K.
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Source Title
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
Print ISSN
1432-2994
Electronic ISSN
1432-5217
Publisher
Volume
75
Issue
1
Pages
67 - 82
Language
English
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Abstract

We study a non-cooperative game for joint replenishment by n firms that operate under an EOQ-like setting. Each firm decides whether to replenish independently or to participate in joint replenishment, and how much to contribute to joint ordering costs in case of participation. Joint replenishment cycle time is set by an intermediary as the lowest cycle time that can be financed with the private contributions of participating firms. We characterize the behavior and outcomes under undominated Nash equilibria.

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Published Version (Please cite this version)