Browsing by Subject "Games with strategic complementarities"

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    Complementarities and the existence of Strong Berge equilibrium
    (EDP Sciences, 2014) Keskin, K.; Sağlam, Ç.
    This paper studies the existence and the order structure of strong Berge equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium, for games with strategic complementarities a la strong Berge. It is shown that the equilibrium set is a nonempty complete lattice. Moreover, we provide a monotone comparative statics result such that the greatest and the lowest equilibria are increasing.
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    On the existence of berge equilibrium: an order theoretic approach
    (World Scientific Publishing, 2015) Keskin, K.; Sağlam, H. Ç.
    We propose lattice-theoretical methods to analyze the existence and the order structure of Berge equilibria (in the sense of Zhukovskii) in noncooperative games. We introduce Berge-modular games, and prove that the set of Berge equilibrium turns out to be a complete lattice. © 2015 World Scientific Publishing Company.
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    Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium
    (Springer, 2021-10) Kamihigashi, T.; Keskin, K.; Sağlam, Çağrı
    Strong Nash equilibrium (see Aumann, 1959) and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (see Bernheim et al., 1987) rely on the idea that players are allowed to form coalitions and make joint deviations. Both of these notions consider cases in which any coalition can be formed. Accordingly, there may arise “conflicts of interest” that prevent a player from choosing an action that simultaneously meets the requirements of two coalitions to which he or she belongs. Here, we address this observation by studying an organizational framework such that the coalitional structure is (i) motivated by real-life examples where players cannot form some coalitions and (ii) formulated in such a way that no conflicts of interest remain. We define an organization as an ordered collection of partitions of the player set such that any partition is coarser than the partitions that precede it. For any given organization, we introduce the notion of organizational Nash equilibrium. We analyze the existence of equilibrium in a subclass of games with strategic complementarities and illustrate how the proposed notion refines the set of Nash equilibria in some examples of normal form games