Browsing by Subject "Free riding"

Now showing 1 - 7 of 7

Open Access
A connection management protocol for promoting cooperation in Peer-to-Peer networks
(Elsevier BV, 2008-02-05) Karakaya, M.; Körpeoǧlu, I.; Ulusoy, Özgür
The existence of a high degree of free riding in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks is an important threat that should be addressed while designing P2P protocols. In this paper we propose a connection-based solution that will help to reduce the free riding effects on a P2P network and discourage free riding. Our solution includes a novel P2P connection type and an adaptive connection management protocol that dynamically establishes and adapts a P2P network topology considering the contributions of peers. The aim of the protocol is to bring contributing peers closer to each other on the adapted topology and to push the free riders away from the contributors. In this way contribution is promoted and free riding is discouraged. Unlike some other proposals against free riding, our solution does not require any permanent identification of peers or a security infrastructure for maintaining a global reputation system. It is shown through simulation experiments that there is a significant improvement in performance for contributing peers in a network that applies our protocol. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Open Access
Counteracting free riding in Peer-to-Peer networks
(Elsevier BV, 2008-03) Karakaya, M.; Körpeoǧlu, I.; Ulusoy, O.
The existence of a high degree of free riding is a serious threat to Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks. In this paper, we propose a distributed framework to reduce the adverse effects of free riding on P2P networks. Our solution primarily focuses on locating free riders and taking actions against them. We propose a framework in which each peer monitors its neighbors, decides if they are free riders, and takes appropriate actions. Unlike other proposals against free riding, our framework does not require any permanent identification of peers or security infrastructures for maintaining a global reputation system. Our simulation results show that the framework can reduce the effects of free riding and can therefore increase the performance of a P2P network. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Open Access
Counteracting free riding in pure peer-to-peer networks
(2008) Karakaya, K. Murat
The peer-to-peer (P2P) network paradigm has attracted a significant amount of interest as a popular and successful alternative to traditional client-server model for resource sharing and content distribution. However, researchers have observed the existence of high degrees of free riding in P2P networks which poses a serious threat to effectiveness and efficient operation of these networks, and hence to their future. Therefore, eliminating or reducing the impact of free riding on P2P networks has become an important issue to investigate and a considerable amount of research has been conducted on it. In this thesis, we propose two novel solutions to reduce the adverse effects of free riding on P2P networks and to motivate peers to contribute to P2P networks. These solutions are also intended to lead to performance gains for contributing peers and to penalize free riders. As the first solution, we propose a distributed and localized scheme, called Detect and Punish Method (DPM), which depends on detection and punishment of free riders. Our second solution to the free riding problem is a connection-time protocol, called P2P Connection Management Protocol (PCMP), which is based on controlling and managing link establishments among peers according to their contributions. To evaluate the proposed solutions and compare them with other alternatives, we developed a new P2P network simulator and conducted extensive simulation experiments. Our simulation results show that employing our solutions in a P2P network considerably reduces the adverse effects of free riding and improves the overall performance of the network. Furthermore, we observed that P2P networks utilizing the proposed solutions become more robust and scalable.
Open Access
A distributed and measurement-based framework against free riding in peer-to-peer networks
(IEEE, 2004) Karakaya, Murat; Korpeoglu, İbrahim; Ulusoy, Özgür
In this paper, we propose a distributed and measurement-based method to reduce the degree of free riding in P2P networks. We primarily focus on developing schemes to locate free riders and on determining policies that can be used to take actions against them. Our proposed schemes require each peer to monitor its neighboring peers, make decisions if they exhibit any kind of free riding, and take appropriate actions if required.
Open Access
Free riding in peer-to-peer networks
(Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2009) Karakaya, M.; Korpeoglu, I.; Ulusoy, Özgür
Free riding in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks poses a serious threat to their proper operation. Here, the authors present a variety of approaches developed to overcome this problem. They introduce several unique aspects of P2P networks and discuss free riding's effects on P2P services. They categorize proposed solutions and describe each category's important features and implementation issues together with some sample solutions. They also discuss open issues, including common attacks and security considerations. © 2009 IEEE.
Open Access
Research issues in peer-to-peer data management
(IEEE, 2007-11) Ulusoy, Özgür
Data management in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems is a complicated and challenging issue due to the scale of the network and highly transient population of peers. In this paper, we identify important research problems in P2P data management, and describe briefly some methods that have appeared in the literature addressing those problems. We also discuss some open research issues and directions regarding data management in P2P systems. ©2007 IEEE.
Open Access
Sabotage in team contests
(Springer, 2019) Doğan, Serhat; Keskin, K.; Sağlam, Çağrı
In the contest literature, sabotage is defined as a deliberate and costly activity that damages the opponent’s likelihood of winning the contest. Most of the existing results suggest that, anticipating a possible sabotage, contestants would be discouraged from exerting high efforts. In this paper we investigate the act of sabotage in a team contest wherein team members exert costly efforts as a contribution to their team’s aggregate effort, which in turn determines the contest’s outcome. For the baseline model with no sabotage, there exists a corner equilibrium implying a free-rider problem in each team. As for the model with sabotage, our characterization of Nash equilibrium reveals two important results: (i) a unique interior equilibrium exists so that the free-rider problem no longer is a concern and (ii) the discouragement effect of sabotage vanishes for some players. On top of those conclusions, we investigate the team owner’s problems of prize allocation and team formation with the objective being to maximize his team’s winning probability.