Browsing by Subject "Disagreement"
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Item Open Access The normative force of certainty: a defense of realism(2021-01) Bölek, SenaCrispin Wright, in Truth and Objectivity, introduces his anti-realist paradigm, arguing that discourse about morality can be truth-apt without holding a realist stance. There, he formulates the criterion of Cognitive Command against realism by claiming that moral realism is defensible if and only if it is a priori that any moral disagreement between realists and anti-realists involves a cognitive shortcoming. In this thesis, the methodology I adopt to defend realism is to uphold Wittgenstein’s claims about certainty against Wright’s criterion of Cognitive Command. In so doing, I argue that the disagreement between realists and anti-realists is a kind of deep disagreement over basic moral certainties, which cannot be rationally resolvable. I then investigate the possibility of basic certainties in metadiscourse by referring to the claims about the existence of moral facts in contemporary metaethics. Taken together, I show that the criterion of Cognitive Command works neither in first-order normative discourse nor in second-order discourse about normativity.Item Open Access Time-varying fairness concerns, delay, and disagreement in bargaining(Elsevier, 2018) Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, K.We study an alternating-offers, bilateral bargaining game where players may derive disutility from accepting shares below what they deem as fair. Moreover, we assume that the values they attach to fairness (i.e., their sensitivity to violations of their fairness judgments) decrease over time, as the deadline approaches. Our results offer a new explanation to delays and disagreements in dynamic negotiations. We show that even mutually compatible fairness judgments do not guarantee an immediate agreement. We partially characterize conditions for delay and disagreement, and study the changes in the length of delay in response to changes in the model parameters.