Browsing by Author "Güner, Serdar Ş."

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    Evolutionary explanations of Syrian—Turkish water conflict
    (Springer, Dordrecht, 2008) Güner, Serdar Ş.; Wiegandt, E.
    The issues of water and territory dominate relations between Syria and Turkey, upstream and downstream riparians in the Euphrates and Tigris basin. This chapter propose an evolutionary game to explore eventual trajectories of riparian relations. Turkish hawks are defined as those Turkish foreign policies that support no water concessions. Turkish doves can instead support the flow of an increased amount of water to Syria on the basis of an international agreement. Syrian hawks are those Syrian foreign policies that do not recognize Turkish sovereignty over Hatay—also known as the Sandjak of Alexandretta. Syrian doves can in turn accept that the territory belongs now to Turkey. It is found that evolutionary stability does not depend upon the values territory and water represent for the fitness of Syrian and Turkish foreign policies. No evolutionary stability is possible unless doves are cooperative towards hawks. If doves are cooperative towards hawks, the unique evolutionarily stable outcome implies their extinction. Riparian relations will ultimately evolve into mutual intransigence.
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    Greek-Turkish territorial waters game
    (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007) Güner, Serdar Ş.; Avenhaus, R.; Zartman, I. W.
    Unlike the previous contributions to this section on Models of International Negotiations this chapter deals with a concrete and as yet unsolved international conflict, namely, that between Greece and Turkey over the breadth of territorial waters in the Aegean Sea. Greece claims that it has the freedom to extend its territorial waters to 12 miles, whereas Turkey has indicated that a Greek extension of territorial waters constitutes a casus belli. Currently, both countries apply the six-mile limit; several crises have occurred over this issue in the past, but the status quo has remained unchanged. © 2007 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
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    Kenneth Waltz talks through Mark Rothko: visual metaphors in the discipline of international relations theory
    (De Gruyter Mouton, 2019) Güner, Serdar Ş.
    Semiotics constitutes an untapped and interdisciplinary source of enrichment for the discipline of International Relations (IR) theory. We propose two visual metaphors to that effect to interpret the figure depicting the central claim of structural realism (SR) offered by late Kenneth Waltz who is one of the most disputed, read, and inspiring IR theorists. The figure is the tenor of both metaphors. The vehicles are two paintings by Mark Rothko, namely, “Green and Tangerine on Red” and the “Number 14.” The metaphors generate innumerable meanings for the tenor and eliminate the criticism that SR is a static and an ahistorical theory. Thus, they benefit the Discipline characterised by academic cleavages on the meaning of theory, science, and production of knowledge.
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    Turkey's EU accession prospects
    (Lexington Books, 2014) Güner, Serdar Ş.; Temel, B.
    This chapter develops a two-stage game of incomplete information to generate insights about future trajectories of Turkey's EU accession process. It is assumed that Turkey perceives the EU members as divided into two groups: Type 1 and the Type 2. The Type 2 members never endorse Turkish accession whereas the Type 1 members do. The types move in the first period of the game and Turkey reacts in the second. The analysis shows that the Type I's time preferences do not count for its cooperative conduct as long as the new Turkish foreign policy (TFP) continues to improve Turkish power and its reputation, domestic reforms are conducted at a steady rate, and Turkish economy continues to thrive. The future potential issues for Type 1 members are, if the new TFP capsizes, domestic reforms stall, or Turkish economic stability becomes deeply shaken. A successful Turkey can quit the process at the slightest belief that no EU member supports its EU bid. It becomes more prone to perceive the Type 1 as the Type 2. A failing Turkey will in turn leave the accession process if both types defect even if it believes that it interacts with the Type 1.