Department of Philosophy
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Browsing Department of Philosophy by Author "Aranyosi, I."
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Item Open Access Excluding exclusion: the natural (istic) dualist approach(Taylor and Francis, 2008) Aranyosi, I.The exclusion problem for mental causation is one of the most discussed puzzles in the mind–body literature. There has been a general agreement among philosophers, especially because most of them are committed to some form of physicalism, that the dualist cannot escape the exclusion problem. I argue that a proper understanding of dualism – its form, commitments, and intuitions – makes the exclusion problem irrelevant from a dualist perspective. The paper proposes a dualist approach, based on a theory of event causation, according to which events are medium-grained, namely parsed into mental and physical property components. A theory of contrastive mental causation is built upon this theory of events, for which the problem of exclusion does not arise.Item Open Access Hesperus is phosphorus, indeed(Springer Netherlands, 2009) Aranyosi, I.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg argues in a recent article that the truth of ‘‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’’ depends on the assumption that the endurance theory of persistence is true. I argue that the premise Wahlberg’s conclusion is based upon leads to absurd consequences, therefore, nothing recommends it. As a consequence, ‘‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’’ has to be true, if it is true, regardless of which theory of persistence one is committed to.Item Open Access The nature of shadows, from Yale to Bilkent(Cambridge University Press, 2010) Aranyosi, I.I discuss a solution to the Yale shadow puzzle, due to Roy Sorensen, based on the actual process theory of causation, and argue that it does not work in the case of a new version of the puzzle, which I call ‘the Bilkent shadow puzzle’. I offer a picture of the ontology of shadows which, together with an alternative view of causation, constitutes the basis for a new solution that uniformly solves both puzzles.Item Open Access A new argument for mind-brain identity(Oxford University Press, 2011) Aranyosi, I.In this article, I undertake the tasks: (i) of reconsidering Feigl's notion of a 'nomological dangler' in light of recent discussion about the viability of accommodating phenomenal properties, or qualia, within a physicalist picture of reality; and (ii) of constructing an argument to the effect that nomological danglers, including the way qualia are understood to be related to brain states by contemporary dualists, are extremely unlikely. I offer a probabilistic argument to the effect that merely nomological danglers are extremely unlikely, the only probabilistically coherent candidates being 'anomic danglers' (not even nomically correlated) and 'necessary danglers' (more than merely nomically correlated). After I show, based on similar probabilistic reasoning, that the first disjunct (anomic danglers) is very unlikely, I conclude that the identity thesis is the only remaining candidate for the mental-physical connection. The novelty of the argument is that it brings probabilistic considerations in favor of physicalism, a move that has been neglected in the recent burgeoning literature on the subject.Item Open Access Powers and the mind-body problem(2010) Aranyosi, I.This paper proposes a new line of attack on the conceivability argument for mind-body property dualism, based on the causal account of properties, according to which properties have their conditional powers essentially. It is argued that the epistemic possibility of physical but not phenomenal duplicates of actuality is identical to a metaphysical (understood as broadly logical) possibility, but irrelevant for establishing the falsity of physicalism. The proposed attack is in many ways inspired by a standard, broadly Kripkean approach to epistemic and metaphysical modality.Item Open Access Quantifier vs. poetry: stylistic impoverishment and socio-cultural estrangement of anglo-american philosophy in the last hundred years(University of Illinois Press, 2012) Aranyosi, I.Item Open Access The reappearing act(2009) Aranyosi, I.In his latest book, Roy Sorensen offers a solution to a puzzle he put forward in an earlier article -The Disappearing Act. The puzzle involves various question about how the causal theory perception is to be applied to the case of seeing shadows. Sorensen argues that the puzzle should be taken as bringing out a new way of seeing shadows. I point out a problem for Sorensen's solution, and offer and defend an alternative view, according to which the puzzle is to be interpreted as showing a new way of seeing objects, in virtue of their contrast with light.Item Open Access Shadows of constitution(Oxford University Press, 2007) Aranyosi, I.Item Open Access Should we fear quantum torment?(Wiley, 2012) Aranyosi, I.The prospect, in terms of subjective expectations, of immortality under the no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is certain, as pointed out by several authors, both physicists and, more recently, philosophers. The argument, known as quantum suicide, or quantum immortality, has received some critical discussion, but there hasn't been any questioning of David Lewis's point that there is a terrifying corollary to the argument, namely, that we should expect to live forever in a crippled, more and more damaged state, that barely sustains life. This is the prospect of eternal quantum torment. Based on some empirical facts, I argue for a conclusion that is much more reassuring than Lewis's terrible scenario.Item Open Access Item Open Access Un argument probabilistic pentruteza identitatii minte-creier(Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, 2009) Aranyosi, I.In this paper I offer a new, probabilistic argument for the mind‐brain identity thesis, put forward by U.T. Place, H. Feigl, and J.J.C. Smart in the 1950s. After considering the epistemic, or conceivability based arguments against physicalism, I build an argument to the effect that naturalistic dualism ‐ the view that phenomenal properties do not metaphysically supervene on physical properties, but they are nomically connected – is probabilistically incoherent. The conclusion will be that phsyicalism, in the form of the identity thesis, is almost surely true.