With their rich imagery and unique effects they generate, metaphors have been used in a variety of discourse. But what are their functions in language and communication? Which mechanisms govern the metaphorical interpretation? These fundamental questions fueled dissensus between different theories of metaphor in philosophical and linguistic frameworks. In the emergence of this ongoing debate, Davidson’s rejection of a special category of metaphorical meaning and his characterization of metaphor in terms of a special effect had an influential role. Lepore and Stone side with the Davidsonian tradition. By stressing the creativity of the user against the conventionality of content, they argue that metaphorical content is open-ended and semantically indeterminate. Moreover, Lepore and Stone ground these arguments in their distinction between imagination and convention, as well as in the notion of conversational record, which are fundamental to their inquiry-based model of language and communication. In this thesis, I present a critique of Davidsonian theories of metaphor, by particularly focusing on their argument from open-endedness. I argue that we must distinguish between two types of metaphors: poetic/creative and ordinary. I claim that ordinary metaphors are not open-ended in the way Lepore and Stone understand them to be. By offering a new interpretation of open-endedness, I illustrate how literal content can, in this regard, be similar to metaphorical. To solve potential challenges of my radical view, rather than providing a pragmatic or contextualist account, I turn to Fillmore’s notion of frames and illustrate the role of information, embedded in lexical items, on our understanding of literal and metaphorical content.