Metaethics and normative ethics are often thought to be two independent enterprises. This view of ethics has been challenged in the recent past and the idea that normative ethics and metaethics should be unified is gaining traction. Against this trend, I argue that the most promising cases for methodological unification in ethics are not compelling. These cases are based on the epistemic implications of metaethical views, conceptual truths in metaethics, claims about the subject matter of morality, metaphysical identity claims in metaethics, and semantic claims about ethical terms. They either fail outright, fail to be of interest to the normative ethicists because they do not bring about methodological revision, or fail to establish unified methodology as an appropriate method for practicing normative ethicists because the costs of the method outweigh the benefits. When all is said and done, normative ethicists do not need to be too concerned with metaethics.