Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisorBerkovski, Yehezkel Sandyen_US
dc.contributor.authorBaşdemir, Alicanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-31T12:36:14Z
dc.date.available2019-05-31T12:36:14Z
dc.date.copyright2019-05
dc.date.issued2019-05
dc.date.submitted2019-05-29
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/51982
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of article.en_US
dc.descriptionThesis (M.S.): Bilkent University, Department of Philosophy, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2019.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (leaves 63-66).en_US
dc.description.abstractThis thesis addresses the ongoing dispute among the New Mechanists on the epistemic and ontic conceptions of mechanistic explanations. The ontic view stipulates that explanations should be based on an identity relation that holds between mechanisms and explanations whereas the epistemic view suggests that explanations should go through a representational medium containing mental and external (scientific) representations to be qualified as explanations. I will articulate the presuppositions of the ontic view which will be followed by demonstrating ways in which the identity claim does not hold due to the distinctive features of actual mechanisms and their explanations. I argue that mechanisms are concrete structures which are based on actual causally productive activities whereas explanations are epistemically and pragmatically abstract items which cite relevant non-occurrences including absences and preventions. In addition, I challenge the weak onticism which is the idea that the ontic view can survive without the identity claim. It is based on the ontic relation that connects explanations to the actual world while their relata are still explanations that is to say that explanations are representations which represent the ontic features of mechanisms. Lastly, I propose arguments to save realism about explanations to show how scientific practice of modelling is compatible with representational-subsumption view of explanations.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Alican Başdemiren_US
dc.format.extentix, 66 leaves ; 30 cm.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectCausal explanationsen_US
dc.subjectMechanistic explanationsen_US
dc.subjectOntic view of scientific explanationsen_US
dc.subjectScientific metaphysicsen_US
dc.subjectScientific modellingen_US
dc.titleOn the impossibility of the ontic view of mechanistic explanationsen_US
dc.title.alternativeMekanistik açıklamanın ontik görüşünün imkansızlığı üzerineen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisherBilkent Universityen_US
dc.description.degreeM.S.en_US
dc.identifier.itemidB156404


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record