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      • Department of Economics
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      Does fiscal decentralization promote fiscal discipline?

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      Author(s)
      Akin, Z.
      Bulut-Cevik, Z. B.
      Neyapti, B.
      Date
      2016
      Source Title
      Emerging Markets Finance and Trade
      Print ISSN
      1540-496X
      Electronic ISSN
      1558-0938
      Publisher
      Routledge
      Volume
      52
      Issue
      3
      Pages
      690 - 705
      Language
      English
      Type
      Article
      Item Usage Stats
      194
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      372
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      Abstract
      We investigate the efficiency and equity implications of a redistributive rule that takes into account both local tax collection efforts and deviation of local incomes from respective targets under alternative fiscal mechanisms. We show that, if the general budget constraint is binding, the proposed transfer rule leads to higher fiscal discipline under fiscal decentralization (FD) than under centralized redistribution. Although the centralized decision yields better income distribution than FD, FD also improves income distribution unambiguously when equalization across regions is targeted explicitly. When localities act strategically, the private sectors utility weight enhances the disciplinary effect of decentralization. © 2016 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
      Keywords
      Fiscal decentralization
      Fiscal discipline
      Redistribution
      Permalink
      http://hdl.handle.net/11693/36596
      Published Version (Please cite this version)
      http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2015.1012920
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