Does fiscal decentralization promote fiscal discipline?

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dc.citation.epage705en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.citation.spage690en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber52en_US
dc.contributor.authorAkin, Z.en_US
dc.contributor.authorBulut-Cevik, Z. B.en_US
dc.contributor.authorNeyapti, B.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-12T10:45:30Z
dc.date.available2018-04-12T10:45:30Z
dc.date.issued2016en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractWe investigate the efficiency and equity implications of a redistributive rule that takes into account both local tax collection efforts and deviation of local incomes from respective targets under alternative fiscal mechanisms. We show that, if the general budget constraint is binding, the proposed transfer rule leads to higher fiscal discipline under fiscal decentralization (FD) than under centralized redistribution. Although the centralized decision yields better income distribution than FD, FD also improves income distribution unambiguously when equalization across regions is targeted explicitly. When localities act strategically, the private sectors utility weight enhances the disciplinary effect of decentralization. © 2016 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/1540496X.2015.1012920en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1558-0938
dc.identifier.issn1540-496X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/36596en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherRoutledgeen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2015.1012920en_US
dc.source.titleEmerging Markets Finance and Tradeen_US
dc.subjectFiscal decentralizationen_US
dc.subjectFiscal disciplineen_US
dc.subjectRedistributionen_US
dc.titleDoes fiscal decentralization promote fiscal discipline?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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