Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorNeyapti, B.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T10:27:34Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T10:27:34Z
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/24322
dc.description.abstractWe reinvestigate the relationship between revenue decentralization (RD), central bank independence (CBI) and inflation by modifying the paper by (ECO 72 (2001) 95). We show that, in contrast to the earlier findings, RD has a negative impact on inflation if accompanied by both CBI and local accountability. In low inflation countries, however, RD has a negative impact on inflation even without these additional factors, though CBI accentuates this effect. © 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleEconomics Lettersen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2003.09.005en_US
dc.subjectCentral bank independence and inflationen_US
dc.subjectFiscal decentralizationen_US
dc.titleFiscal decentralization, central bank independence and inflation: a panel investigationen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.citation.spage227en_US
dc.citation.epage230en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber82en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2003.09.005en_US
dc.publisherElsevier BVen_US
dc.identifier.eissn1873-7374


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record