Fiscal decentralization, central bank independence and inflation: a panel investigation
| dc.citation.epage | 230 | en_US |
| dc.citation.issueNumber | 2 | en_US |
| dc.citation.spage | 227 | en_US |
| dc.citation.volumeNumber | 82 | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Neyapti, B. | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-02-08T10:27:34Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2016-02-08T10:27:34Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2004 | en_US |
| dc.department | Department of Economics | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | We reinvestigate the relationship between revenue decentralization (RD), central bank independence (CBI) and inflation by modifying the paper by (ECO 72 (2001) 95). We show that, in contrast to the earlier findings, RD has a negative impact on inflation if accompanied by both CBI and local accountability. In low inflation countries, however, RD has a negative impact on inflation even without these additional factors, though CBI accentuates this effect. © 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.econlet.2003.09.005 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.eissn | 1873-7374 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0165-1765 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11693/24322 | |
| dc.language.iso | English | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier BV | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2003.09.005 | en_US |
| dc.source.title | Economics Letters | en_US |
| dc.subject | Central bank independence and inflation | en_US |
| dc.subject | Fiscal decentralization | en_US |
| dc.title | Fiscal decentralization, central bank independence and inflation: a panel investigation | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
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