| dc.contributor.author | Karagözoǧlu, E. | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Keskin, K. | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Saǧlam, Ç. | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-02-08T09:34:18Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2016-02-08T09:34:18Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0165-4896 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11693/20742 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We introduce a minimal notion of altruism and use it to refine Nash equilibria in normal form games. We provide three independent existence proofs, relate minimally altruistic Nash equilibrium to other equilibrium concepts, conduct an in-depth sensitivity analysis, and provide examples where minimally altruistic Nash equilibrium leads to improved predictions. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | English | en_US |
| dc.source.title | Mathematical Social Sciences | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.10.003 | en_US |
| dc.title | A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| dc.department | Department of Economics | en_US |
| dc.citation.spage | 422 | en_US |
| dc.citation.epage | 430 | en_US |
| dc.citation.volumeNumber | 66 | en_US |
| dc.citation.issueNumber | 3 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.10.003 | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_US |
