A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium

Simple item page
dc.citation.epage430en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.citation.spage422en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber66en_US
dc.contributor.authorKaragözoǧlu, E.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKeskin, K.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSaǧlam, Ç.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T09:34:18Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T09:34:18Z
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractWe introduce a minimal notion of altruism and use it to refine Nash equilibria in normal form games. We provide three independent existence proofs, relate minimally altruistic Nash equilibrium to other equilibrium concepts, conduct an in-depth sensitivity analysis, and provide examples where minimally altruistic Nash equilibrium leads to improved predictions.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.10.003en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-4896
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/20742
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.10.003en_US
dc.source.titleMathematical Social Sciencesen_US
dc.titleA minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibriumen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium.pdf
Size:
430.26 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Full printable version
Download
Collections
Department of Economics